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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-2(a)-3 based upon pourover by the supreme
court.
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether appellant is entitled constitutionally to greater

notice than other parties after he has refused mail from opposing
counsel, failed to stay in contact with the court and failed to
keep the court notified of his current mailing address?
Standard of Review:
1.

Constitutional questions are reviewed independently.

See

State v. Benson, 845 P.2d 254 (Utah 1992).
2.

Review of trial court's determination of law is usually

characterized by term "correctness".

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932

(Utah 1994).
B. Whether the Fourth District Court properly exercised its
discretion when it denied the appellant's motion for relief under
Rule 60(b).

Standard of Review: It is largely within the discretion of the
trial court to set aside a judgement that has been ordered on
a

party's

liberally

default

and,

exercised

in

while
favor

this
of

discretion

a defaulting

should
party,

be
the

decision of the trial court will not be reversed on appeal in
absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
P.2d 1126 (Utah 1984).

1

Pitman v. Bonham, 677

C.

Whether the judgment maybe reaffirmed on any other

grounds.
Standard of review:
Reviewing court will affirm a trial court's decision
whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even though it
is not the ground on which the trial court relied in it's
ruling.

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelev Const. Co,

677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Ut. 1984).
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
1.

Utah Constitution Article 1 Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

2.

Utah Code Annotated 78-13-4
An action may properly be brought "in the county
where such obligation is to be performed, the
contract was signed, or in which the defendant
resides."

3.

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mistake; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake,
inadvertence,
surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party, (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action
has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by rule 4 (e) and the defendant has failed to
appear in said action; (5) the judgement is void; (6) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which is based has been revised or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any

2

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceedings was
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules by an independent action.
4.

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

55(c)

SETTING

ASIDE

DEFAULT.
For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60 (b).
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal arose out of the denial of appellant's Rule 60(b)
Motion for Relief

from

judgment, which was filed over

four(4)

months after entry of judgment and six(6) months after trial in
this

matter.

Appellant

claims

lack

of

due

process

in

the

proceedings before the trial court.
B. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITIONS
This matter arose out of a real estate transaction between
appellees and appellant wherein the appellant sold property with a
well, which well created numerous health problems. (R. at
Appellant

breached

his

contract

and

actively

hid

the

home's

numerous defects from appellees prior to closing. (R. at 4-5)
problems

were

hidden

form

the

appellees

until

after

5-6)

The

closing,

although they inspected the home and made an attempt to check on

3

the water quality while they were contemplating the purchase of the
home.

(Complaint See R. at 2) Plaintiffs were damaged by becoming

sick through the water, loss of work time to repair numerous holes
and

other

problems

of which

they

were

not

aware

contrary

to

contract, and repair of defects which were actively hidden from
them by the defendant. (R. at 4-6)
of

1994, and

appellant

The sale was completed in April

immediately

breached

the

agreement

by

failing to leave the home within the time specified in the addendum
to the contract.

(R. at 5)

He further breached his extension

agreement by failing to clean the home, leaving it in a shambles.
(R. at 5)
Beginning June 15, 1994, appellant was represented by D. Kevin
Degraw of Waddingham and Peterson. (R. at 13) Appellant maintained
the same counsel until August 29, 1995, when counsel filed a notice
of withdrawal.

(R. at 54)

The notice of withdrawal

gave the

mailing address of appellant as a post office box in Logandale,
Nevada, and a copy was sent to appellant. (R. at id)
Following withdrawal of counsel, appellees filed Notice to
Appear or Appoint (R. at 55), a request for pretrial filed October
2, 1995 (R. at 56), Supplementation of Discovery filed November 3,
1995 (R. at 61) and Request for Admissions filed December 26, 1995
(R. at 63). The court sent two pretrial notices (R. at 60 and 65)
and notice of non-jury trial to be held on February 15, 1996 on
January

18, 1996, 28 days before trial

documents were sent until February

(R. at 66).

5, 1996

No other

when a Motion for

Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support thereof, as well as
4

Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted were filed (R. at 70, 71 and
80).

The four documents mailed by appellees prior to the Motion

for Summary Judgment were all returned from the Logandale, Nevada
address stamped "REFUSED". (R. at 88, 89, 90 and 91)
court nor counsel were ever

informed

Neither the

of a mailing

address

in

Windsor, Connecticut nor Hong Kong, nor was the court notified that
the mail was delayed in reaching Mr. Turley until he filed his
affidavit in regard to Motion for Relief from Judgment. (Cf R. at
122 and 141)

Appellant did not attend either of the telephonic

pretrials (R. at 187) held in December of 1995 and January of 1996,
and the only contact he had with the court prior to August 22,
1996, was a telephonic message on February
continuance.

(Telephonic

message

not

13, 1996 requesting

numbered

as

part

of

the

record, and included in the brief of appellant)
On

February

15,

1996,

appellees'

admissions

were

deemed

admitted (R. at 92), and this resolved all outstanding remaining
questions of fact. (R. at 187) Judgment was subsequently entered
for appellees April 18, 1996 (R. at 100), and notice of entry of
judgment was filed May 6, 1996. (R. at 110)
Following notice of entry of judgment, an ex parte order of
attachment was issued July 30, 1996 for personal property belonging
to appellant. (R. at 115)

Following the issuance of the ex parte

order, appellant filed his motion to set aside default judgment on
August 22, 1996. (R. at 119)

The court entered an order denying

appellant's motion for relief from judgment December 9, 1996. (R.
at 186)

Final judgment having been entered, notice of appeal was
5

filed December 19, 1996. (R. at 200)
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case presents the court with a party to litigation who
has voluntarily removed himself from the country to seek employment
and voluntarily dismissed counsel, (R. at 122-128) leaving himself
without

an

agent

to

act

for

him

in

communicate with the opposing party,

the

state,

refuses

to

(R. at 88-91 ) refuses

to

acknowledge orders of the court, (R. at 187) and then seeks relief
from judgment without time limit after.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

Appellant had his answer stricken due to his failure to

participate in the proceedings, default entered against him.

After

the Order of Judgment was entered against him, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure controlled post judgment motions for relief.

Rule 60(b)

jurisprudence controls this appeal.
B.

Relief under Rule 60(b) is available only to those acting

in good faith.

Following the discharge of his attorney in August

of

continuing

1995,

and

until

August

22,

1996,

appellant's

involvement in the action consisted of two acts: (1) the refusal of
all mail sent by appellees to him through December of 1995; and (2)
a lone phone call to the clerk of the court requesting continuance
of trial two days hence. He otherwise ignored all mail sent by the
court and appellees.

He did return to the United States in early

July of 1996, in time to have filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion, but
took no action until after execution on his personal property had
begun.

This lack of interest is bad faith, and will not support

6

Rule 60(b) relief.
C.

Appellant has made a number of claims for relief, both

below, and in this appeal. He makes no claim under Rule 60(b)(2),
new

evidence,

60(b)(3)

fraud

or

misconduct,

or

60(b)(6)

satisfaction of judgment. He was properly served and entered a
general appearance, preventing a 60(b)(4) claim, and because the
parties were residents of Millard County, the acts complained of
occurred

there,

contracts

the

executed

real
there,

property
the

was

trial

located

court,

there

being

jurisdiction had jurisdiction and venue was proper.

of

and

the

general

The grounds

for relief under Rule 60(b) most similar to his claim is that of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, 60(b)(1).
Appellant, being pro se, does have a superficial claim for
indulgence

from the trial court due to his unfamiliarity

procedure and rules of the court.

with

However, when a pro se party

refuses communications from the opposing party, does not contact
the court for long periods of time, makes himself unavailable to
the court for pretrial or other hearings, and does not contact the
court once he returns to the United States, that is indifference,
and not excusable or a mistake.
Finally, Rule 60(b) relief is time barred.

Time expired

pursuant to the Rule on July 18, 1996 for claims under 60(b)(1)(4).

A reasonable time is allowed for claims under 60(b)(5)-(7).

Due to the indifference of appellant, and the lack of contact with
either the court or appellees for six months, the court ruled that
three (3) months was reasonable, and had expired.

7

D.

Appellant made a claim under 60(b)(7) for due process.

Due process is a matter of balancing the needs of the party with
the community based upon what is fair and decent, neither ignoring
the individual's needs, nor overburdening the court or opposing
parties.

In

this

matter,

appellant

voluntarily

made

himself

scarce, and now complains that, although he provided no means of
speedy reliable communication, the appellees should bare the burden
for late notice of trial.

When considered compounded on the fact

that he made no effort to attend any pretrial conference, and
refused

communications

with

appellees,

it would

be

unfair

to

provide this special treatment to appellant.
E.

Although relief was sought and denied under Rule 60(b),

this court may reaffirm the judgment on any other grounds.
trial court resolved all remaining

The

issues of fact at trial by

deeming the Requests for Admissions admitted. Remand would serve no
purpose.

Alternatively, because this is a 60(b)(1) claim, relief

can be denied as time barred.
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

RULE 60(B) CONTROLS THE AVAILABILITY OF RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT HEREIN.
The trial court, by its minute entry of February 15, 1996
(R. at 94), and order of judgment entered April 18, 1996 (R. at
110),

deemed

admissions

admitted,

struck

appellant and entered default judgment.
of Civil Procedure

controls default

follows:

8

the

answer

of

the

Rule 55 of the Utah Rules
judgments

and provides

as

For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b). (underline added)
,
Judgment has been entered in this matter. (R. at 100)

In

addition, Rule 58(A)(d) requires notice of entry of judgment, with
notice of service on the opposing party.

That notice was given and

filed May 6, 1996. (R. at 110) Pursuant to the rules, a default
judgment has been entered and notice given of entry pursuant to the
rule by the appellees. Rule 60(b) therefore controls the motion to
set aside the judgment.
B.

'

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH.

Relief from judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
is predicated upon a basic showing of good faith.
Chrysler,

5 Ut.2d

415, 303 P.2d

995

(1956).

See Chrysler v.
The

Rule

itself

provides in material part that the relief is to be "upon such terms
as are just" and that it should be "in the furtherance of justice".
Although this is admitted by the appellant in his brief, he then
minimizes the discretion of the Trial Court, assumes good faith and
presumes that relief will further justice.

In Pitman v. Bonham,

677 P.2d 1126 (ut. 1984) the court held as follows:
It is largely within the discretion of the Trial
Court to set aside judgment which has been entered on a
party's default and, while this discretion should be
liberally exercised in favor of the defaulting party, the
decision of the trial court will not be reversed on
appeal in absence of a clear abuse of discretion Pitman
v. Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (Ut. 1984).
The Trial Court did exercise its discretion after
reviewing

the

behavior

appellant

court

must

of

appellant

respect

that

9

and

the

discretion

record
absent

and

the

abuse.

Paragraph eight of the Order denying relief provides as follows,
and

gives

as

good

a

description

of

bad

faith

to

support

discretionary denial of relief as one might ask for:
On April 18, 1996 this Court's Order of Judgment was
filed. In its Order, the Court noted the following: the
Defendant refused the Plaintiffs' discovery request;
Defendant failed to appear, either in person or
telephonically, at both scheduled pre trial conferences;
the plaintiffs' Request for Admissions dealt with
remaining issues of fact in the matter, and Defendant did
not timely respond to those requests; and Defendant
failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Therefore, based on Defendant's failure to
comply and cooperate with discovery, as well as a failure
to appear at either scheduled pretrial conferences or the
non-jury trial, this court entered a default judgment.
(R. at 187-188)
Appellant's counsel withdrew, pursuant to defendant's request,
on August 29, 1995 (R. at 54). Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial
Administration requires opposing counsel to send Notice to Appear
or Appoint, and bars all activity for twenty

(20) days.

There

after this notice was filed September 5, 1995, (R. at 55) and no
further action undertaken until the Request Pretrial filed October
2, 1995, twenty-seven days later. (R. at 56)
Appellant not only failed to appear or respond, from September
1995

though January

1996 he returned

"Refused". (R. at 188-1991)

the mail

from

appellees

Appellant also failed to contact the

trial court for either pretrial, but he did attempt to have the
trial continued without any indication as to when an appropriate
time would be.

If his intentional refusal to cooperate is any

indication as to when trial could go forward, it is likely that no
trial would ever be held.
Appellant

next

showed

his
10

complete

disinterest

in

the

proceedings by failing to contact the court

from February 13, 1996

until after execution had begun, although he was back in the United
States for about a month prior to execution and with three months
of entry of judgment. (R. at 115 and 141)

During this six month

period of no contact, the order was entered, (R. at 100) Notice of
Entry of Judgment was sent to him, (R. at 111) and appellees went
forward

to collect on their

judgment by

initiating

a writ of

attachment on the personal property of the appellant. (R. at 115)
What seemed to be apparent to the trial court in its order,

as

well as to the appellees now, is that appellant had no interest in
whether

the

judgment

was

entered

possibility of collecting from him.

or

not

until

there

was

a

He apparently believed that

there was no possibility in collecting from him while he was in
China, and so did not need to protect his interests until August of
1996 when execution began.

Appellant admits that he was in the

United States for a month and a half prior to filing his motion
before he did anything. (R. at 141) This does not sound like an
individual who was acting in good faith or was at all concerned
about the proceeding to which he was a party.

No relief should be

granted under provisions of Rule 60(b) to appellant.
C.

NO RELIEF Is AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 60(B)(1)-(6).

Rule 60(b) provides in material part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
11

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party, (4) when, for any cause,
the summons in an action has not been personally served
upon the defendant as required by rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgement is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
is based has been revised or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order, or proceedings was entered or
taken.
Appellant is making confusing claims which touch on most of
the Rule 60(b) subdivisions.

As a result, appellees will address

each subdivision in turn.
1.

Appellant alleges excusable neglect or mistake, but should not

be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
Appellant is alleging that he should be relieved from what is
essentially a mistake that has, through inadvertence or excusable
neglect, kept him from successfully defending in this matter.

The

mistakes are the inability to receive mail in a timely fashion or
at all while he was out of the country after he fired his attorney.
This argument ignores: (1) appellants failure to keep the court
informed of his actual address and correct mailing address (R. at
188-191 and 141); (2) his refusal to cooperate with discovery (R.
at 188-191); and (3) failure to make any attempt to participate in
pretrial conferences or schedule a make up time with counsel or the
court

(R. at 187-188).

Appellant claims he should have been

informed of his duties and liabilities by the court as a pro-se
defendant, but fails to say

just how or when this could have
12

happened when he made no attempt to stay in communication with
anyone.

Appellant essentially states he should he relieved from

judgment because, as a pro se defendant, he did not know he needed
to pay attention to the court's notices or correspondence from the
opposing parties, and thus everything he did was excusable error
because he was pro-se.
The Federal Courts, ruling on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) upon which Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of
is based, have interpreted Federal Rule 60(b) as requiring the
establishment of a legal ground before relief from a judgment may
I
be granted, and when such a ground does not exist ffit would be an
abuse of discretion to open judgment". See Western Union Tele.
Company v. Dismenq, 106 F.2d 362 (10th Cir 1939).

And in Greater

Baton Rouge Golf Association v. Recreation & Park Comm'n for Parish
of East Baton Rouge, 507 F.2d 227 (5th Cir 1975), the court stated
that Rule 60(b) was designed to provide relief from "technical
error".

The "technical errors" which appellant present to the

court as the basis

for relief are essentially

his refusal

to

cooperate with opposing counsel, failure to make any appearance and
lack of effort to remain abreast of actions in the trial court.
The record is extremely informative as to the interest expressed by
appellant in this matter until his property was going to be seized
through the writ of attachment issued July 30, 1995 (R. at 115).
That is, there was none.
3fn Interstate Excavating Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611
P. 2d 369 (Utah 1980), a case similar to this one in one respect,
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and cited by appellant, the counsel
pretrial.

However,

appellant

for defendant withdraw

herein

unlike

the

at

Interstate

defendant in that the Interstate defendant claimed to have received
no notice to appoint counsel, and no notice of trial until a
default was entered, which Mr. Turley did have here.

Setting aside

a default was appropriate in that case. See also Sperry v. Smith,
694 P. 2d 5801 (Utah 1984).

A case more on point, though, is Russel

v. Martellf 681 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984), wherein appellant failed for
a long period to do anything, default was proper and relief denied
because of the demonstrated indifference of appellant in pursuing
his opportunity to defend.

One phone call between withdrawal of

counsel on September 29, 1995 (R. at 54) and Motion to Set Aside
filed August 22, 1996 (R. at 119) looks very much like indifference
for a long time. Because the basis for relief, although couched in
terms of "due process", is in reality one of excusable neglect or
mistake, and the neglect is in fact indifference, no relief may be
granted.
2.

No relief has been sought under 60(b)(2), 60(b)(3) nor

60(b)(6).
Appellant has not alleged 60(b)(3) fraud, either extrinsic
intrinsic, misrepresentation or misconduct by the appellees or
their counsel as a basis for relief

(See R. at 122 and 151).

Neither is there an allegation of newly discovered evidence having
an impact on this matter under 60(b)(2).

(See R. at id)

The

appellant is also not claiming to have satisfied discharge to his
debt under the judgment under rule 60(b)(6). (Cf R. at id)
14

3.

There is no relief available under Rule 60(b)(4)
The appellant was properly served and a return was filed with

the court June 15, 1994 (R. at 20) and a personal appearance was
made by answer (R. at 13). There may be no relief under 60(b)(4)
inasmuch

as personal

service was had

and

appellant

entered

a

general appearance through his answer.
4.

No relief is available Under Rule 60(b)(5)
Pursuant to the complaint, (R. at 1) and not disputed in the

answer (R. at 14), this matter dealt with breach of contract and
real property located in Millard County, where the trial court.
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-13-4, an action may properly
be brought "in the county where such obligation is to be performed,
the contract was signed, or

in which

the defendant resides."

Appellees allege that all parties are or were residents of Millard
County, and the real property is located in Millard County, in
Delta, Utah. (R. at 1 ) Appellant admitted these were true (R. at
I
14).
A special addendum was signed at the time of closing with
regard to the property in Millard County (R. at 4 ) , and appellant
admitted

execution of the document

at the time of closing

in

Millard County (R. at 16).
In appellants Motion for Relief, he claimed that the judgment
was void as an alternative claim for relief.
the contract was executed,

However, inasmuch as

the real property

is located,

actions complained of occurred and the parties all resided

the
in

Millard County, venue and jurisdiction were a proper with the trial
court.

No relief may be granted under 60(b)(5).
15

5.

Rule 60(b) relief is time barred
The

trial

court

also

ruled

the Motion

time

barred.

If

subsection (1) is the proper grounds for relief, relief may not be
granted.

More than three months have passed from the Order of

Judgment on April 18, 1996 (R. at 100), until the Motion for Relief
was filed August 22, 1996. (R. at 120)

See Laub v. South Central

Utah Telephone Assoc. Inc., 657 P.2d

(Utah 1982).

provides

three months

subsections

(1)-(4).

for bringing

a motion

Rule 60(b)

for relief

Because the claim is one of

under

essentially

excusable neglect, no review should be necessary, it being barred
by the rule.
The trial court also found the alleged 60(b)(7) (discussed
below) claim time barred.

This was based upon the claim that mail

through Logandale took 25 days to reach appellant, and he did
nothing from when judgment was entered from May 11, 1996,(twentyfive days after April 18, 1996) the day notice of judgment should
have reached him until August 22, 1996.

During this time, he was

back in the United States (R. at 141) within three (3) months of
entry of the Order, and did what he had done since August 29, 1995,
nothing.

The rule calls for a "reasonable time", reasonable being

discretionary with the trial court and highly fact specific.
Here, three months was "reasonable", since no action occurred,
although appellant had opportunity, until execution began, and he
showed no interest at all until that time.
D.

NO BASIS FOR RELIEF EXISTS UNDER RULE 60(b)(7).
Appellant's

final

attempt

is to make

16

a claim

under

Rule

60(b)(7) for "any other reason justifying relief".

Upon review of

the claim, the argument seems to boil down a claim by appellant
that it took a long time, twenty-six days, for mail to reach him in
China when it was routed through the Logandale, Nevada address
(which his former counsel gave to the court and opposing counsel at
the time of withdrawal (R. at 54)), then through the Connecticut
address to Hong Kong, (an address which is still not disclosed),
and finally hand carried to him in China, which long time prevented
him from effectively defending himself.

Alternatively, he claims

that because mail service to him was so uncertain, he not having
received most of the court notices or mail from counsel, (something
not capable of corroboration or disproof) it is unfair for him to
be held responsible
examining

for any mail sent

the arguments

to him at all.

that due process

requires

Before

inquiry

and

accommodation of his voluntary inaccessibility, a review of what
constitutes due process is necessary.
The right to due process is enshrined in the Utah Constitution
in Article I, section 7, which is based upon the United States
Constitutional due process guarantees found in the Vth and XlVth
Amendments.

In Galvan V. Press, 74 S.Ct 737, 347 U.S. 522, 98

L.Ed. 911 (1954), rehearing denied 75 S.Ct 17, 348 U.S. 852, 99 L.
Ed. 671, the court held that "Fair play is the essence of 'due
process'".
In Breithauot v. Abram, 77 S.Ct. 408, 352 U.S. 432, 1 L.Ed.2d
448 (1957) the court further explained that:
Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yard
stick of the personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the
17

most sensitive person, but by the whole community sense
of "decency and fairness" that has been woven by common
experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct.
Breithaupt, 77 S.Ct. at 410, 352 U.S.at 436.
What,

then, is the "decent and fair" thing to do in regard to

notice?
Should due process notice be a matter of individual inquiry in
every case, and should the court and opposing parties be put on a
constitutional quest to find a guaranteed method of service to
parties, or is due process a matter of notice reasonably calculated
to inform while not
opposing parties?

imposing

an undue burden on the court or

First, it should be noted that a method is

available for relief due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable
neglect

(the

actual

situation

complained

of

with

slow

mail

service), and that is to bring a motion for relief under Rule
60(b)(1) within three (3) months of entry of judgment.

Appellant

was back in the United States in early July 1996 (R. at 141), which
was within three months of the entry of judgment on April 18, 1997.
(R. at 100)

Between February 15, 1996 and July, 18,1997, he could

have called a friend or relative to check on the status of this
case, he could have sent a request to the court for information
regarding what had happened, he could have telephoned the court,
which he has shown the court that he could do,(unnumbered telephone
message) or he could have written to opposing counsel.
of these four things.
In

Nelson

v.

He did none

He sat on his rights for six months.

Jacobsen,

669

P.2d

1207

(Utah

1983),

the

defendant filed a timely motion for new Lrial which was denied.
His appeal was granted on the basis that "timely and adequate
18

notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the
very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson, 699 P.2d at 1211. The
facts are that Mr. Nelson had his complaint dismissed, and then
reinstated at a hearing.
set.

A further hearing for one week later was

Notice did not arrive at the defendant's address until two

days before trial at which time he learned the "hearing" was the
trial.

The only similarity between this action and Nelson, is the

arrival of notice about two days before trial.

Mr. Jacobsen, gave

attention to the proceedings, and the unfair burden, of notice
arriving two days before trial, was neither "decent" nor "fair".
Relief timely requested should have been granted therein.

Mr.

Turley, appellant herein, is not Mr. Jacobsen.
Appellant herein evidenced by the content of his message,
which he left with the court clerk on February 13, 1996, that he
understood

that February

15, 1996 would

be a trial.

He was

therefore "adequately informed... of the specific issues." He knew
pretrials were being held in December of 1995 and January of 1996.
(R. at 60 and 65) Nelson v. Jacobsen, 699 P.2d at 1213.
as in Breithaupt, we

Whether,

look to the community's view of "decency or

fairness", or Nelson1s "basic fairness", each looks at all of the
facts, not

just

the one most

sensitive

person.

In Nelson ,

Jacobsen: (1) was involved in all pretrial activities; (2) attended
the hearings; and (3) read his mail.

Here, Mr. Turley: (1) refused

to correspond with opposing parties (R. at 88-91); (2) failed to
contact the court in any pretrial were the trial date was set (R.
at 182); (3) did not inform the court of his current address; and

1f

(4) did nothing for most of one year, to include bring a timely
motion.

Nelson states that

M

'due process' is not a technical

concept that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.

Rather, 'the demands

of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure
demand a procedure appropriate to the case just to the parties
involved'" Nelson, 699 P. 2d at id quoting Rupp v. Grantsville City,
610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980).

It was without doubt a burden to

receive his mail delayed to his employment site in China.
what is fair or decent in allowing appellant to

However,

take no steps on

his own behalf to mitigate the time delay or notify the court that
it exists and then setting aside appellee's judgment?

Appellant

went well beyond excusable neglect in this indifference and lack of
good common sense.

He instructed his agent in Nevada to refuse

letters sent by opposing counsel to the only address which had been
provided instead of sending them on.

He also failed to not act in

a circumspect or timely manner, as opposed to Mr. Jacobson, and
allowed more than six months to elapse after a call to avoid trial
before he became concerned again with the case, and then only
because execution commenced.
It is further

interesting

to note that his statements

in

regard to his failure to receive mail all fall under the category
of self-serving.

It is quite amazing to appellees that appellant

did not receive: (1) notice of withdrawal of his own counsel (R. at
54);

(2) notice to appear or appoint (R. at 55); (3) notice of

hearing dates sent out by the court
20

(R. at 59); (4) notice of

setting pre-trial in Provo (sent by court) October 27, 1995 (R. at
60), or (5) notice of hearing (sent by court). (R. at 65)

He also

states, by affidavit, that he never received the motion for summary
judgment although it was not returned marked refused, which was
filed February 5, 1996 (R. at 70), the order deeming admissions
admitted (sent by the court), (R. at 92) filed February 15, 1996,
the affidavit of attorneys fees, (R. at 116) the Minute Entry for
February 15, 1996, (R. at 94) or any of the other documents sent
while he was out of the United States.

The sole exception is the

notice of non-jury trial, although all of the above were sent more
than 26 days before he returned in July of 1996.

While the above

is possible barely, the responsibility for receiving mail by Mr.
Turley sent through the post office, and being acted upon properly,
should be that of Mr. Turley once he has been properly served.

His

motion seems propose that opposing counsel, and the court, insure
that every mailing is received, not simply properly mailed, but
gives no suggestions as to how to accomplish this without personal
service every

time.

Parties could then hide or give a false

address or addresses, which, as here, substantially delay delivery
of mail, deny justice to the opposing parties, increase costs and
interfere with the administration of justice.
It is ridiculous and offensive to think that due process can
be twisted to allow a party, who at best is indifferent
proceedings,

the

opportunity

for

endless

delay

and

to the

frivolous

appeal, as exists herein.
With regard to the U.S. Supreme Court case and Utah Supreme
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Court case which were relied by the appellant regarding notice,
both Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed.2d 865 (1950), and Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d
851 (Utah 1981), deal with adequacy of notice of an impending
action through service of process.
60(b)(4) matter.

Basically, this is a Rule

Neither case has anything to do with post

service-of-process notice

as in this matter, and are easily

distinguished in that dealt with individuals not parties to an
action, and not notice after a party

has been properly

and

personally served. Workman v. Naqle Const., Co.,802 P.2d 749 (Utah
App.

1990), is likewise distinguishable in that it dealt with

voiding a judgment where there was no notice to members of the
class of individuals who were disadvantaged

by the judgment.

Again, there is no doubt that Mr. Turley had personal notice, made
appearance, and then chose to become indifferent to results.

No

relief under 60(b)(7) should be granted.
E.

THE COURT MAY AFFIRM ON OTHER GROUNDS THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT
The trial court noted in its Order Denying Relief that all
factual

issues were

resolved

by

the admissions

being deemed

admitted (R. at 176). Appellant did not identify this finding of
facts as incorrect, it is not in dispute.

In Bill Nay & Sons

Excavating v. Neelev Const. Co, 677 P.2d 1120 (Ut. 1984) the court
held that:
Reviewing court will affirm a trial court's decision
whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even though it
is not the ground on which the trial court relied in it's
ruling. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelev Const. Co,
22

677 P.2d at 1121 (Ut. 1984).
In as much as there are no remaining factual issues, judgment
is proper for appellees even without default.

The court may

affirm solely on the basis that there will be no issue for trial on
remand.
The court may also find the matter time barred, it being
properly a Rule 60(b)(1) issue, or time barred under Rule 60(b)(7),
a reasonable time having elapsed prior to filing of the Motion for
Relief.
CONCLUSION
It is appropriate for this court to deny the appeal in this
matter,

there being no valid claim under Rule 60(b)(7) of due

process violation, and the time having run on both Rule 60(b)(1)
and

60(b)(7)

claims

prior

to

the

filing

of

this

motion.

Alternatively, all factual issues have been resolved in favor of
appellees,

and

there would

no

issues

remaining

unresolved

remand.
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Attorney for Appellees,
Edward L. and Brenda DeWolf
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